z228 Louis A. Piret Jr. notably in the form of the Torricelli Law (i992) and the Helms-Burton Law (1996) -have been mostly more of the same, always accompanied by confident predictions that the application of more sanctions would deliver the desired results -but always with the same results as before.
US policy presently stands at once as an anomaly and an anachronism. It has outlived its historical time and outlasted its political purpose. It is derived from assumptions that long ago ceased to have relevance to the post-Cold War environment, designed as a response to threats that are no longer present, against adversaries that no longer exist. The security imperatives that originally justified sanctions, based on the proposition that Cuba was an instrument of Soviet designs, to be contained on every occasion and countered at every opportunity, are no longer plausible. This is not to suggest, of course, that sanctions against Cuba are without a constituency, possessed of an agenda and endowed with the capacity to allocate substantial financial resources through which to obtain political influence. The lobbying success of the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF) is well-known. Nor are sanctions without support among those for whom communism and the attending curtailment of freedom of speech and press and violation of human rights are a genuine anathema, although it should be noted that many who deplore conditions in Cuba often appear to have fewer objections to cordial relations with other countries whose human rights record is less than exemplary.
But the Cuban-American lobby and anti-communism alone do not explain adequately the steadfast commitment by the United States to a policy whose most remarkable feature has been its singular failure to achieve its intended objective. The explanation must thus be sought elsewhere. That US policy may have long ago lost its initial instrumental rationale does not mean, of course, that it is without an internal logic. The sources of sanctions can be located within the larger context of the narratives by which North Americans fashioned the terms of selfrepresentation. We must examine the realms of policy where the premise of the propriety of the US purpose assumed the appearance of being normal and universal, where the prerogative of power often passed for the pursuit of beneficence. Much can be understood by returning to the beginning, to the point at which the interplay of complex historical circumstances and political conditions acted to give US policy its enduring form and function. The context of US policy offers insight into the content, from which to derive purpose as a source of persistence. This is to conceive policy as an artefact, a product of social circumstance, culturally derived and ideologically driven which, when turned in on itself, can be made to yield insight into the assumptions by which policy persists long after it has been shown to have failed and is without prospects of success.
Fear and Loathing of Fidel Castro 2zz29
The United States response to Cuba was very much conditioned by its deepening antipathy toward Fidel Castro. Policies that Washington perceived as inimical to US interests and contrary to professed values came to be associated entirely with the person of the Cuban leader. That Castro embraced communism was sin sufficient to guarantee US ire. That it happened in a country where the United States had historically imposed its will and got its way deepened the insult of the injury.
II
The die of US policy was cast forty years ago, the product of the moment, assembled as a series of improvisations and impulses, in response to circumstances and events, sometimes as conditioned reflexes, other times as pragmatic expedients. Policy calculations were derived from cognitive categories often flawed by a mixture of misinformation and misinterpretation, sometimes driven by factors wholly extraneous to Cuba, a process in which the US response as often as not contributed to the very Cuban outcomes it sought to prevent.
What happened in Cuba in I939 must be viewed as one of the more improbable events in the most unlikely of places. North Americans viewed early developments in Cuba with a mixture of incomprehension and incredulity. Much had to do with the pace of events: everything moved so quickly, as events with portentous implications seemed to accelerate from one day to the next, in vertiginous succession. There was no frame of reference with which to take measure of developments in Cuba: no precedent, no counterpart, but most of all, there was no understanding of the larger historical circumstances from which the Cuban revolution had emerged. Senator Barry Goldwater was entirely correct when he described a US public who 'shook their heads in bewilderment' at developments in Cuba. ' Much had to do with the nature of the Cuban revolution. The presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba shattered the terms around which the USA had fashioned a sense of its well-being since early in the nineteenth century. The missiles in i962, and the subsequent deployment of Soviet combat troops, the establishment of intelligencegathering facilities, and the maintenance of a Soviet submarine base on the south coast of Cuba challenged some of the central assumptions upon which US strategic planning had rested. In a security culture so very much shaped by notions of 'balance of power' and 'spheres of influence', the presence of the Soviet Union at a distance of a mere ninety miles wrought havoc on some of the most fundamental premises of US strategic matter how great our military capacity might be, Cuba could be an enemy base for airplanes, submarines, and missiles which could penetrate our defense. '7 Related too was the matter of the Monroe Doctrine. Early in the nineteenth century the USA had proclaimed the primacy of US interests in the Western Hemisphere, and in so doing claimed a sphere of influence on a grand scale from which the European presence was proscribed. These elements were central to US strategic thinking, for they acted to The implications were apparent and appeared equally dire to everyone. 'The United States faces in Soviet-supported Castro's Cuba an intolerable threat to its prestige and its security which has to be eliminated,' warned US Charg6 Daniel Braddock. The Cubans had 'unacceptably violated' the Monroe Doctrine, Rostow insisted, adding: 'As Cuba emerged under communist control, a visceral reaction developed in the government that this was an outcome with which the United States could not live.' Richard Nixon was categorical, warning that 'Castro is a dangerous threat to our peace and security -and we cannot tolerate the presence of a communist regime 90 miles from our shores'. CIA Deputy Director Richard Bissell arrived at the same conclusion: 'A Communist government in Cuba, ninety miles from the US mainland, was unacceptable. '12 The principal discursive categories through which the United States responded to developments in Cuba set in relief some of the more anomalous circumstances of policy formulations. Economic sanctions were designed in conjunction with covert action. Indeed, the pairing of sanctions with sabotage was designed to foster economic disarray, disrupt production systems, and increase domestic distress through shortages and scarcities as a way to generate popular discontent with Fidel Castro and thereby impair his ability to govern and undermine his capacity to manage the economy. Sanctions were designed to bestir the Cuban people to political action by subjecting the population to hardship as a way to erode popular support of the Castro government. I anticipate that, as the situation unfolds, we shall be obliged to take further economic measures which will have the effect of impressing on the Cuban people the cost of this Communist orientation. We hope, naturally, that these measures will not be so drastic or irreversible that they will permanently impair the basic mutuality of interests of Cuba and this country. 
X
The policy bears the traces of the trauma by which purpose was fixed more than forty years ago and derives sustenance in the umbrage that Fidel Castro visited upon the United States. Castro deeply offended US sensibilities. For more than four decades he has haunted the United States: a breathing, living reminder of the limits of US power. He challenged long-cherished notions about national well-being and upset prevailing notions of the rightful order of things. This is exorcism in the guise of policy, an effort to purge Fidel Castro as an evil spirit who has tormented US equanimity for more than four decades. Cultures cope with the demons that torment them in different ways and indeed the practice of exorcism assumes many forms. Castro occupies a place of almost singular distinction in that nether world to which the United States banishes its demons. Fidel Castro is the man the US public loves to hate: political conflict personified, loaded with Manichaen insinuations, the frustration of decades of unsuccessful attempts to force Cuba to bend to the US will vented on one man. US policy possesses a punitive aspect to its purpose, a determination to punish Castro, a way to avenge past wrongs, which in this instance means vanquishing Fidel Castro once and for all. New York Times foreign affairs editor Thomas Friedman was entirely correct in suggesting that the US position on Cuba is 'not really a policy. It's an attitude -a blind hunger for revenge against Mr. Castro'..6 That Fidel Castro has endured at all, that he has survived countless US-sponsored assassination attempts, one armed invasion, and four decades of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, has resulted in no small amount of confoundment and consternation in Washington. Only the total and unconditional vanquishing of Fidel Castro can vindicate the policy to which the United States has so fully committed itself. By the end of the 1990s US policy assumed a life of its own. Its very longevity serves as the principal rationale for its continuance.
The legacies -will relations resume, for when relations do become 'normal' again, the people of each country will carry memories of the last four decades for years to come. How these memories will shape the future can be considered only in the realm of conjecture, of course, but it requires no gift of prophecy to understand that the deeper the wounds the more difficult the healing. Cubans and the US population will long be affected
